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Hurst: Will the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994) Ever Be Uniformly

CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN TRADE SECRETS

Thomas F Cotter*
Patent lawyers are familiar with a phenomenon commonly referred
to as "blocking patents," under which a patentable improvement over an
existing patented invention may go unused, unless both the improver
and the owner of the earlier patented invention agree to cooperate. To
illustrate, suppose that I invent and patent a novel and nonobvious
composition of matter that can be used to reduce or prevent the adverse

physiological effects of physical exercise or environmental exposure;
and that this invention comprises four elements or "limitations"--water,
sugar, electrolytes, and glycerol in a concentration from about 0.5% to
5.0%-which I shall refer to as A, B, C, and D.' You then conceive of
an improvement comprising limitations A, B, C, D, and E, where E
stands for some additional element to be added to my patented
composition of matter. If the addition of element E results in a new
composition that is both a useful and nonobvious improvement over my
invention, you can obtain a patent on the improvement, thereby
obtaining the right to exclude me from making, using, or selling a
composition comprising A, B, C, D, and E. (I could, of course, continue
to make, use, and sell the composition comprising A, B, C, and D only).
Obtaining a patent only allows one to exclude others from making,
using, or selling one's patented invention, however, and does not create
an affirmative right to make, use, or sell the invention oneself.2 Thus,

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. I wish to thank
Margreth Barrett, Robert C. Denicola, and Christopher Slobogin for their comments and
criticism; Jon Anderson & Associates Printers for assistance with graphics; and Donald Kirk,
Jason Lazarus, and Jennifer Perry for their research assistance. Any errors that remain are mine.
1. The example is drawn from U.S. Patent No. 4,981,687, issued Jan. 1, 1991
(Compositions and Methods for Achieving Improved Physiological Response to Exercise).
Subject to certain conditions, any person who "invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (defining novelty).
In addition, the Patent Act requires that the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art be "such that the subject matter as a whole would [not] have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
[the] subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Once a patent is granted, it entitles the
patentee to exclude others from, among other things, making, using, or selling the patented
invention within the United States for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues
and ending twenty years from the date on which the patent application was filed. 35 U.S.C. §§
154(a), 271(a).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (granting the patent holder "the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States").
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my patent on the composition of A, B, C, and D would entitle me to
exclude you from making, using, or selling your improvement thereon,
because for you to do so would infringe my patent.' Under these
circumstances, then, neither you nor I may practice the improvement
without first receiving permission from the other; each of us can "block"
the other from making, using, or selling the improvement, which will
thereafter stand idle unless each of us agrees to license the other. This
"blocking patents" phenomenon has received considerable scholarly
attention concerning whether the present system, which relies upon
voluntary agreement among the parties to free up the improvement for
public exploitation, should be changed to an alternative system under
which the parties would be required to license one another at some
statutorily or judicially fixed rate.4
A case that I teach in my intellectual property class, Structural
Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp.,'
has led me to consider whether an analogous phenomenon can arise in
the context of trade secret law.6 To illustrate the "conflicting interests"
phenomenon I have in mind requires first a brief explanation of some
fundamental principles of this body of law. Under the Uniform Trade
Secret Act (UTSA), which a majority of states (including Florida) have
adopted,7 a trade secret is defined as:

3. See, e.g., Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1996) ('To literally infringe, the accused device or process must contain every
limitation of the asserted claim.") (citing Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 E2d 1533, 1535
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
4. See, e.g., JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES §
2.13[6][d] (Release #4, 1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1092-94 (1995); Gianna JulianArnold, InternationalCompulsory Licensing: The Rationalesand the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 353
& n.15 (1993); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and BargainingBreakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents,62 TENN. L. REV. 75,77-78 (1994); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPs-Natural
Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 466
(1996); Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law and Patent Misconduct in the ProprietaryDrug
Industry, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1209, 1259-61 (1994).
5. 401 F Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
6. Technically, the phenomenon I am about to describe can arise if the information at
issue is confidential information that does not qualify for protection as a trade secret-though
under the modem definition of "trade secret" set forth above, most confidential information of
value to business organizations probably does qualify for such protection. This phenomenon may
arise regardless of whether the information is patentable.
7. FLA. STAT. ch. 688 (1995). Other sources of trade secret law upon which courts rely
as persuasive authority include the restatements. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1939). In addition,
Congress recently enacted the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, which makes trade secret
misappropriation a federal crime under certain circumstances. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat.
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information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that...
derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and...
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.'
Trade secret protection therefore extends not only to information that is
sufficiently novel, useful, and nonobvious that it could qualify for patent
protection, but more generally to any information that provides one with
a competitive advantage as long as it remains secret.9 The owner of a
trade secret may exclude another from, among other things, acquiring
the secret by "improper means" such as theft or espionage; or from
using or disclosing the secret if the other knew (or had reason to know)
at the time of his disclosure or use that the secret was derived from a
person who (1) had used improper means to acquire it, or (2) had
acquired it under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy, or (3) owed a duty of secrecy to the owner.11 Unlike a
patentee, however, the owner of a trade secret cannot exclude one who
independently invents or discovers the subject matter of the secret from
making use of this information; nor can she prevent one from attempting
to discover, and subsequently exploiting, the secret through reverse
engineering.' 2
When one who is employed by another discovers or invents a trade
secret, ownership of the secret may vest either in the employee or
employer, depending on the circumstances. One commentator, after
surveying the relevant case law, has suggested that, for purposes of both
trade secret and patent law, courts in effect classify employee-inventors
as falling into one of three categories which he refers to as "specific
inventive," "general inventive," and "non-inventive."' 3 A specific
inventive employee is one "who is either (1) hired to invent a specific

3488, 3489 (1996).
8. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985).
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39. By contrast, in order
to obtain a patent, an inventor must publicly disclose how to practice her invention, as well as
the "best mode" contemplated by her of carrying out the invention as of the time of application.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
10. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(i) (1985).
11. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(ii).
12. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43.
13. Robert L. Gullette, State Legislation Governing OwnershipRights in Inventions Under
Employee Invention Agreements, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 732, 732-33 (1980).
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invention or (2) is assigned the task of making a specific invention or
improvement to existing technology.' ' 14 At common law, a specific
inventive employee is deemed implicitly to assign ownership of her
work to her employer. 5 Ownership of an invention created by a noninventive employee (one who is not expected to engage in any inventive
activity), by contrast, vests in the employee. 6 The third category of
general inventive employees consists of those who are hired to invent,
such as research scientists and design engineers, but from whom "no
specific invention or end result is contemplated."' 7 Ownership of the
work of a general inventive employee initially vests in the employee,
but may be expressly or implicitly assigned to the employer." Among
the factors a court will consider in determining whether or not a general
inventive employee has implicitly assigned her invention to her
employer are:
the nature and scope of the employment relationship, the
amount of money or other resources the employer devoted
to the inventive activity, how closely the employee's
invention is related to the employer's business, whether the
employee has assigned inventions to the employer in the
past, and any other evidence of an implicit understanding
between the parties about ownership of inventions. 9
In the case of non-inventive employees and general inventive employees
who are deemed to own their own inventions, however, the employer
may be deemed to have a "shop right"-"an irrevocable, nonexclusive,
non-assignable right to use the trade secret, without an obligation to pay
royalties"--if the secret "is related to the employer's business and the
employee, in developing it, used her employer's time, facilities,
personnel, materials, money or other resources."2

14. Id. at 733.
15. MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 82

(1995); Gullette, supra note 13, at 734.
16. Gullette, supra note 13, at 733-34.
17. Id. at 733.
18. BARRETT, supra note 15, at 82; 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS

§ 5.02[4][c], at 5-74 to 75 (1996). Some states, however, have enacted statutes modifying, in
various respects, the rules relating to assignment. See generally Gullette, supra note 13, at 74060 (discussing state legislation from Minnesota, Washington, and California).
19. BARRETT, supra note 15, at 82; see also I MILGRIM, supra note 18, § 5.02[4][c], at
5-74 to 76 (discussing in what situation an employer would be entitled to a "shop right"-an
irrevocable nonexclusive license).
20. BARRETT, supra note 15, at 83.
21. Id.; see also I MILGRIM, supra note 18, § 5.02[4][c], at 5-75 to 76 (stating that even
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Because the law of trade secrets penalizes only the disclosure or use
of the trade secret of another, an employee who owns a trade secret
created during her employment does not violate any duty created by
trade secret law if she uses or discloses this information to the detriment
of the entity that employed her at the time of its creation. In theory,
however, she may violate duties owed to this entity under the law of
contract or fiduciary obligations, and it is this possibility of conflicting
interests between employer and employee that gives rise to the
phenomenon under consideration. To illustrate, let us assume that D
discloses or uses information which qualifies as a trade secret, and that
P claims that this disclosure or use constitutes a breach of a duty of
secrecy which D owes to P. Depending on the facts, it is possible that
D owes P a fiduciary duty of secrecy, a contractual duty of secrecy, a
trade secret duty of secrecy, or any combination thereof (or none of
them). The diagram below illustrates the various possible combinations of
duties, with the top circle representing the contractual duty of secrecy: the
left bottom circle representing the fiduciary duty of secrecy; and the right
bottom circle representing the trade secret duty of secrecy.
CONTRACT
DUTY

FIDUCIARY
DUTY

TRADE SECRET
DUTY

if the "matter involved was not within [the] scope of employment," the employer may still be
entitled to a shop right).
22. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § l(2)(ii) (1985).
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Regions I, II, and III illustrate how D's disclosure or use may violate
only a single duty of secrecy. Thus, in Region I, D's disclosure or use
violates a fiduciary duty of secrecy, but not a contractual or trade secret
duty of secrecy. An example would be where D is a non-inventive
current employee of P, who has not executed an enforceable nondisclosure agreement with her employer. Because a current employee owes
her employer a fiduciary duty not to disclose or use information during
the term of her employment in competition with the employer, D's
disclosure or use would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty even
though D owns the secret.23 Region II represents the situation in which
D's disclosure or use violates a contractual duty of secrecy only. For
example, this would be the case where D is a non-inventive former
employee of P who has executed an enforceable nondisclosure agreement (but who has not assigned the secret to P).24 The fact that the
employment relationship has terminated frees D of any fiduciary obligation to abstain from disclosing or using her own secret, but D would
remain bound by an enforceable contractual obligation. Region III
represents the situation in which D's disclosure or use violates only a
trade secret duty of secrecy. An example would be the famous case of
E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,' in which the defendants obtained trade secretive information concerning a plant duPont

23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 393,395 (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmts. b, c, & e (1995) (discussing the employer/employee relationship).
24. Because of their potentially anticompetitive nature, nondisclosure agreements and
covenants not to compete are not uniformly enforceable.
[S]ince such agreements can reduce or eliminate potential competition, they are
subject to the traditional rules governing contracts in restraint of trade and are
accordingly enforceable only when ancillary to a valid transaction and otherwise
reasonable. See Restatement, Second, Contracts §§ 186-188. As a general matter,
a restraint is unreasonable if it is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate
interests of the promisee or if the promisee's interest in protection is outweighed
by the likely harm to the promisor or to the public. Id. § 188, Comment a.
...
A promise by an employee not to compete with the employer after the
termination of the employment or by a seller of a business not to compete with the
buyer after the sale may be justified as a reasonable attempt to protect confidential
information, provided that the duration and geographic scope of the covenant are
appropriately related to the promisee's legitimate interests....

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. d; see also I MILGRIM, supra note
18, § 4.02[1][d], [2][a].
25. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
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was building in Texas, by taking aerial photographs of the site.26
Because the use of aerial surveillance was deemed to be an improper
means of acquiring the information, the defendants' subsequent
disclosure or use of that information would violate a duty owed to
duPont under the law of trade secrets,27 but (absent a contractual or
fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendants) neither a
contractual nor a fiduciary duty.
Regions IV through VII illustrate how D's disclosure or use may
violate multiple duties of secrecy owed to P. In Region IV, D violates
fiduciary and trade secret duties of secrecy. For example, if D is a
current or former specific inventive employee, her disclosure or use of
her employer's secret would violate the UTSA (because the secret
belongs to P) and also the fiduciary duty owed by former employees to
refrain from disclosing information belonging to their former employers,
in competition with those employers." It would not, however, violate
a contractual duty in the absence of an enforceable nondisclosure
agreement. In Region V, D violates a contractual and trade secret duty
of secrecy but not a fiduciary duty. A common setting in which this
situation would arise would be where D is an independent entity that
licenses P's trade secret. D's disclosure or use of the secret beyond what
is permitted by the license would violate not only the terms of the
license but also the trade secret duty by disclosure or use of information
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty of secrecy. 9 It
would not, however, violate any fiduciary obligation, inasmuch as a
licensee usually is not considered to be a fiduciary of the licensor. An
example of a situation illustrating Region VI, where D violates a
fiduciary and contractual duty of secrecy but not a trade secret duty of
secrecy, would be where D, a non-inventive employee who has executed
an enforceable nondisclosure agreement, while employed by P discloses
or uses a trade secret, which she developed during her employment and
which belongs to her, in competition with P. Finally, in Region VII, D
violates all three duties. This situation would occur where P owns the
secret and D owes P both a fiduciary and contractual duty of secrecy-as, for example, when D is a current or former specific inventive
employee and has signed an enforceable nondisclosure agreement.
In theory, the conflicting interests phenomenon can arise whenever
the employee owns the secret but is obligated under the law of contracts

26. Id. at 1013.
27. Id. at 1015-16; see Unif. Trade Secrets Act § l(2)(ii)(A) (1985).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 42 & cmts. b, c, & e (1995).

29. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II).
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or fiduciary obligations not to use or disclose it in competition with her
present or former employer-that is, in certain cases inhabiting Regions
I, II or VI. This phenomenon would not be precisely analogous to the
blocking patent phenomenon because, as noted above, the employer in
the situations under discussion herein may have a shop right to use the
secret in its own business. Courts seem to agree, however, that a shop
right does not entitle an employer to sell or license the secret to others,
even though selling or licensing it, as opposed to merely using it in the
employer's own business, may be the information's most highly valued
use." As in the blocking patent situation, then, the optimal use of the
information depends upon the two parties' being able to agree to some
form of licensing, or else upon judicial or legislative action to force an
agreement when one otherwise might not be forthcoming.
The crucial issue, of course, is whether there are any real-world cases
inhabiting Regions I, II, or VI, in which the employee owns the subject
information but is precluded from using or disclosing it under the law
of contracts or fiduciary obligations. I suspect there are few such cases
falling within Regions I and VI, because an employee who uses
information (even if it is his own) in competition with or to the
detriment of his current employer is probably unlikely to remain in the
latter's employ for very long. Once the Region I or VI employee/trade
secret owner ceases his employment, he is free to use the information
as he pleases unless he is a Region VI employee subject to an enforceable post-termination nondisclosure agreement (in which event his case
moves from Region VI to Region IEupon cessation of employment).
The more important question, then, is whether there are any relevant
real-world cases inhabiting Region II.

30. See, e.g., Melin v. United States, 478 F.2d 1210, 1215 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (stating that shop

rights are not assignable); Tripp v. United States, 406 F.2d 1066, 1070 (Ct. CL. 1969) (holding
that owner of shop right in invention is not entitled to license others to use invention) (citing
Ushakoff v. United States, 327 F.2d 669, 673 (Ct. Cl. 1964)). These results seem to square with
the historical development of the shop right doctrine, as stated by the United States Supreme
Court:
Since the servant uses his master's time, facilities and materials to attain a concrete
result, the latter is in equity entitled to use that which embodies his own property
and to duplicate it as often as he may find occasion to employ similar appliances
in his business. But the employer in such a case has no equity to demand a
conveyance of the invention.... This remains the property of him who conceived
it, together with the right conferred by the patent, to exclude all others than the
employer from the accruing benefits.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1933).
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On reflection, I would guess that there are few such Region II cases
either, because both employers and the courts can take steps to avoid
having cases, of this nature arise. Employers generally can avoid Region
II cases by requiring their employees to agree to the advance assignment
of any employee innovations created during the term of employment;
and even if the parties fail to agree to such an express assignment, a
court would have several options for avoiding a conflicting interests
problem. One such option would be to construe the nondisclosure
agreement as including an implicit assignment of any innovations to the
employer. StructuralDynamics arguably presents an example of a court
employing this option.32 In the early 1970s, Surana and Kothawala,
computer engineers employed by Structural Dynamics Research
Corporation (SDRC), worked on developing a computer program for use
in isoparametric modeling.3 These two individuals, along with a third
engineer-employee, Hildebrand, each executed a nondisclosure agreement forbidding him from divulging or using, during or after his
employment with SDRC, "any privileged or confidential information,
trade secret or other proprietary information... imparted or divulged
to, gained or developed by... Employee during his employment with
' The three engineers subsequently terminated their
the Company."34
employment and established a competing business, Engineering
Mechanics Research Corporation (EMRC), where they completed and
began marketing a version of the program.35 SDRC in the meantime
completed its own version of the program, and then filed suit against the
engineers and EMRC for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach
of contract.36 The court appears to have concluded that Surana, who did
most of the work on the project, was a general inventive employee-that

31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. g (1995) ("[A]bsent
an applicable statutory prohibition, agreements relating to the ownership of inventions and
discoveries made by employees during the term of the employment are generally enforceable
according to their terms."); see also BARRETT, supra note 15, at 83 (discussing enforceability
of advance assignments); 1 MILGRIM, supra note 18, § 4.02[l][a], at 4-12 to 14 (discussing how
to create an advance assignment).
32. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
33. Id. at 1107.
34. Id. at 1112. Kothawala also executed an employment contract which forbade him,
during the period of his employment or thereafter, from disclosing to anyone "any confidential
information or trade secrets concerning the business affairs of SDRC ...imparted or divulged
to, gained or developed by or otherwise discovered by Kothawala during his employment with
SDRC." Id. at 1113. Each defendant also agreed not to compete with SDRC for a discrete period
of time following termination. Id. at 1112-13.

35. Id. at 1106-08.
36. Id. at 1105, 1109.
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is, one who (absent an assignment of rights) owed SDRC neither a
fiduciary nor a trade secret duty of nondisclosure or nonuse.37 Construing the defendants' nondisclosure agreements as obligating them to
refrain from disclosing or using the subject information in competition
with SDRC, the court found the defendants in breach of these agreements.38 Although this outcome on its face would appear to give rise
to the conflicting interests phenomenon, by assigning an ownership
interest to Surana while at the same time precluding him from using the
secret, other portions of the opinion suggest that the court understood
the agreement as containing an implicit assignment of the secret to
SDRC.39 If this is the correct interpretation of the opinion, then, the
court avoided the conflicting interests phenomenon by ultimately
assigning both property and contract rights to one party, the employer.
One problem with the Structural Dynamics approach, however, is
that reading an implicit assignment clause into the agreements at issue
in that case seems somewhat arbitrary. Granted, one might surmise that
the parties did not intend, by virtue of the nondisclosure agreements, to
create a conflicting interests situation. Very likely they intended either
that all innovations created during the term of employment would
belong to SDRC, as the court arguably ultimately concluded-or that the
agreement obligated the defendants only to refrain from using or
disclosing secrets belonging to SDRC, but not secrets in which
ownership originally vested in the defendants. Under this latter
interpretation, the conflicting interests problem would have been avoided
by the assignment of an ownership interest to Surana coupled with the
elimination of any contractual obligation to refrain from exploiting that
interest. The ambiguity in the agreement, however, makes it difficult to

37. Id. at 1112; but see id. at 1116 (stating that the information "was acquired in the
course of [Surana and Kothawala's] employment and afufillment [sic] of theirspecific assigned
responsibilities")(emphasis added); see dlso supra text accompanying notes 13-21 (discussing
the types of inventive employees).
38. StructuralDynamics, 401 F. Supp. at 1118.
39. The opinion lacks clarity on this issue. In various portions of the opinion, the court
appears to refer to the information as belonging to SDRC. See id. at 1117 (referring to the
program as "confidential and proprietary to SDRC"); id. at 1118 (referring to "plaintiff's
confidential information"); id. at 1119 (referring to "SDRC's confidential information"); id. at
1120 (stating that "SDRC also seeks a license fee.., for use of its program," and that
defendants are liable for unauthorized use of "SDRC's confidential information"). Moreover, the
last portion of the opinion seems premised on the assumption that SDRC was free to continue
using the information as it wished, well beyond the limited scope of a traditional shop right. See
id. at 1117-20. On the other hand, if the court had meant to find an implied assignment it should
have found Surana liable for breach of fiduciary duty and (assuming the subject information
qualified as a trade secret, an issue on which the court ultimately declined to pass judgment)
misappropriation of trade secrets, as well as for breach of contract-something it did not do.
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determine which of these two interpretations better squares with the
parties' intent at the time of contracting. To avoid Region II in other
similar cases therefore might require the court arbitrarily to choose one
plausible interpretation over the other, an outcome that may be difficult
to square with the rule of law. Perhaps, though, a rule interpreting such
agreements in favor of the defendant employee---contrary to the
outcome of StructuralDynamics-could be justified as more consistent
with general notions of fairness or (because the employer is usually in
a better position to avoid or insure against the risk of ambiguity)
economic efficiency.
Yet another strategy would be to construe a nondisclosure agreement
of the type at issue in StructuralDynamics to mean what it appears to
say-that the defendant cannot use the subject information following
termination, regardless of who owns it-and then to decide whether the
agreement is enforceable in cases where the defendant happens to own
the information. Professor Denicola has argued that such an agreement
should be unenforceable under section 41 comment d of the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition.' This section states that nondisclosure
agreements encompassing information "in which the promisee has no
protectable interest, such as a former employee's promise not to use
information that is part of the employee's general skill and training may
be unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint of trade"' because "[t]he
employer has no legitimate justification for restricting a former
employee's use of information that the employer does not own."4' Like
the strategy of interpreting the agreement in favor of the employee, this
solution avoids the conflicting interests problem by assigning ownership
to the employee while eliminating the contractual obligation of secrecy.
Given the courts' general reluctance to enforce post-termination
restrictions on account of their potential anticompetitive nature,43 this
solution may hold out the most promise as a principled means of
avoiding the conflicting interests problem.
I am not so sure that this solution would apply in every case,
however. The Restatement does not precisely define the terms

40. Letter from Robert C. Denicola, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law, to Thomas F. Cotter (Jan. 29, 1997) (on file with author) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. d (1995)).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §

41 cmt. d (citations omitted); cf.
FLA. STAT. § 542.335(b) (Supp. 1996) (stating that a person seeking enforcement of a restrictive
covenant must prove the "existence of one or more legitimate business interests justifying the
restrictive covenant").
42. Denicola, supra note 40.
43. See supra note 24.
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"protectable interest" and "general skill and training.""4 The resulting
ambiguity leaves open the possibility that, under the right circumstances,
a court might enforce an agreement forbidding the former employee
from using or disclosing his own secret. An illustration of the ambiguity
surrounding these terms is provided by some of the case law discussing
the enforceability of contract provisions, known as holdover clauses, that
require the employee to assign to the employer inventions created within
a period of time after termination of employment. Like other posttermination restrictions, these provisions are enforceable only if, among
other things, the employer is deemed to have a protectable interest in the
subject information, and the information is not considered to be merely
part of the employee's general skill and training.4' At least two courts
have nevertheless concluded that, in some instances, the employer may
have a protectable interest in an employee's post-termination invention,
even though the invention is attributable only to the employee's earlier
exposure to the employer's non-trade-secretive information.46 But if an

44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (discussing "general
skill and training"); id. cmt. e (appearing to draw a distinction between a trade secret owned by
an employee and that employee's general skill and knowledge).
45. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 887-88 (N.J. 1988) (stating
that a holdover clause is unenforceable if it: "(1) extends beyond any apparent protection that
the employer reasonably requires; (2) prevents the inventor from seeking other employment; or
(3) adversely impacts on the public").
46. See id. at 893-94:
Ingersoll-Rand ...argues that it is inequitable to limit an employer's "protectable
interest" solely to trade secrets and other confidential information. Today, large
corporations maintain at great expense modem research and development programs
that involve synergistic processes. Such "think tanks" require the free and open
exchange of new ideas among the members of a research staff using the employer's
body of accumulated information and experiences. This creative process receives
its impetus and inspiration from the assimilation of an employer's advanced
knowledge and a spontaneous interaction among colleagues, co-employees, and
superiors. Ingersoll-Rand argues that it maintains this creative atmosphere in its
research and development effort at great expense and that it should be allowed to
protect itself against a former employee who invents a unique, competing concept
attributable to such brainstorming ....
We agree with Ingersoll-Rand that the protection afforded by holdover
agreements such as the one executed by the parties in this lawsuit may under
certain circumstances exceed the limitation of trade secrets and confidential
information.
See also Campbell Soup Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (D.N.J. 1991)
(recognizing that employers may have legitimate interests in protecting "information that is not
'a trade secret or proprietary information, but highly specialized, current information not
generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the research environment furnished
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employer can have a protectable interest in information that (1) is
created by the employee after termination, and (2) would, in the absence
of an enforceable assignment, clearly belong to the employee, it is
difficult to understand why the employer in a case like Structural
Dynamics cannot have a protectable interest in information that (1) is
created prior to termination, and (2) would, in the absence of a
nondisclosure agreement, clearly be subject to disclosure and use by the
employee. It seems odd, in other words, to countenance enforcing
promises to assign inventions to employers, while at the same time
categorically refusing to enforce promises only to refrain from using or
disclosing those inventions for a limited period of time. I should think,
then, that it might be possible for a court to enforce some posttermination restrictions on the employee's use or disclosure of his own
secret.47 Enforcing such restrictions, of course, would finally bring us
squarely within the boundaries of Region II.
A court choosing this final option of enforcing the restriction on the
employee's use or disclosure of his own secret would then have two
further choices to make: either to enjoin both parties from using the
secret without the other's consent (as in the blocking patent situation),
or to impose some form of cross-licensing arrangement. Perhaps the
Structural Dynamics case can be read as authority for this latter
resolution as well. In the last portion of the opinion, the court declined
to enjoin the defendants from further use of the program.4" Instead, the
court required the defendants to pay a 15% royalty on all of EMRC's
sales for a three-year period, reasoning that it would have taken a
competitor three years to duplicate the program by independent
research.49 The result was that both SDRC and EMRC were able to
continue exploiting the secret, without having to negotiate over terms,
upon compliance with the court's order. Perhaps an outcome of this
by the employer, to which the employee has been "exposed" and "enriched" solely due to
his employment' ") (quoting Ingersoll-Rand,542 A.2d at 894), vacated on other grounds,
977 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1992).
47. I have no idea how frequently courts might be willing to enforce such restrictions,
however. I note that in Ingersoll-Rand, the court, after discussing the rules relating to holdover
clauses, found in favor of the defendant employee. See Ingersoll-Rand,542 A.2d at 892-96.
48. StructuralDynamics, 401 F Supp. at 1120.
49. Id. at 1119-20. By the time the opinion was handed down, the three-year period, which
the court concluded should begin running from the date of EMRC's contacts with its customer
American Motors Corporation in March 1973, had only six more months to go. Id. at 1120.
Perhaps the brevity of the remaining time period was a factor in the court's decision not to
enjoin the defendants, but rather to condition their further use upon the payment of a royalty.
Cf.infra note 57 (discussing the "exceptional circumstances" under which a court may permit
the misappropriator of a trade secret to continue using the secret upon payment of a reasonable

royalty).
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nature can be viewed as more in keeping with the rough equities of a
difficult case.
Whether a court faced with a genuine Region II case should feel free
to fashion some sort of equitable remedy as in StructuralDynamics, or
should instead leave it up to the parties to draw up their own terms for
exploitation of the secret, is a difficult issue. In the analogous case of
blocking patents, Congress and the judiciary have opted for the latter
option over a compulsory licensing scheme. Professor Merges has
defended this choice of what is referred to in the law and economics
literature as a "property rule" on the following grounds:
[A] property rule makes sense for patents because: (1) there
are only two parties to the transaction, and they can easily
identify each other; (2) the costs of a transaction between
the parties are otherwise low; and (3) a court setting the
terms of the exchange would have a difficult time doing so
quickly and cheaply, given the specialized nature of the
assets and the varied and complex business environments in
which the assets are deployed. Hence the parties are left to
make their own deal."
Merges also argues that compulsory licensing systems tend to discourage
the formation of voluntary institutions, such as patent pools"' (or, in the
copyright field, organizations such as ASCAP and BMI) which can
efficiently reduce the transaction costs that otherwise threaten to inhibit
voluntary bargaining.52 Thus, if Merges and other advocates of the
present patent system are correct in asserting.that compulsory licenses
are economically inefficient, courts in future Region II cases may be
well-advised to leave the parties to their own devices." Indeed, one
50. Merges, supra note 4, at 78.
51. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2662 n.27 (1994) ("Patent pools are industry-wide agreements, often accompanied
by administrative structures, to centralize all firms' patents for automatic out-licensing or to
cross-license each others' patents.").
52. Id. at 2662-63, 2667-73.
53. I should emphasize that the reasons suggested above for rejecting a compulsory
licensing system as a response to the blocking patent phenomenon do not necessarily imply that
construing a nondisclosure agreement so as to give rise to a conflicting interests phenomenon,
and then relying upon the parties to that agreement to work out a solution to the ensuing
problem, is the optimal response to cases such as StructuralDynamics. As discussed above, it
may be optimal in all or most such cases to construe the agreement so as to avoid preventing
the party whom the court determines to be the owner of the subject information from using and
disclosing it, or else to find the contract unenforceable. See supranotes 31-43 and accompanying
text. The argument above merely suggests one possible path for the court to take once it decides,
rightly or wrongly, that the case falls within Region II.
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might argue that, if we can bear the risk of doing without compulsory
licensing in patent law, we can certainly do without it in trade secret
law, assuming that the value of the typical patented invention-and
hence the social value that is lost if the invention is not exploited-is
greater than the value of the typical trade secret.'
Other scholars disagree with the current rules relating to blocking
patents, however, arguing that a variety of obstacles may inhibit the
original patentee and the improver from reaching agreement, such that
compulsory licenses are a necessary stick with which to force an
agreement that benefits the public.5 Applying game theoretic principles, Professors Ayres and Talley also have suggested that, in the
blocking patent scenario, the parties may be more likely to reach
efficient private bargains in the shadow of a compulsory licensing rule
because the existence of compulsory licensing as a fallback encourages
them to be more forthcoming in disclosing information concerning the
value they place upon their innovations. Moreover, the argument that
compulsory licenses in patent law would discourage the formation of
voluntary institutions that can facilitate transactions more efficiently than
under a system of nonvoluntary rules may not seem so forceful in the
context of the conflicting interests problem described herein. The
development of voluntary institutions to deal with this problem (other
than the routine use of advance assignment agreements) may be unlikely
if, among other things, the problem arises much less frequently than the
blocking patent phenomenon. Finally, it may not be beyond the
institutional competence of the courts to create compulsory trade secret
licenses, particularly if the typical trade secret is less complicated than
the typical patent. The drafters of both the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition clearly expected the
courts to be capable of determining the amount of a reasonable royalty
when necessary. 7
54. But see David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 61, 63 (1991) (arguing that trade secret law does not necessarily protect only "a

class of lesser inventions").
55. See, e.g., Julian-Arnold, supra note 4, at 365-67; Oddi, supra note 4, at 466; Sanzo,
supra note 4, at 1259-61. Merges agrees that the parties may fail to reach agreement, and he
recognizes that such failures can cause substantial social losses when the improvement at issue
constitutes a radical advance over existing technology. Merges, supra note 4, at 91. Merges
argues, however, that an expanded use of the reverse doctrine of equivalents-a rarely-invoked
patent doctrine that permits the trier of fact to absolve an ostensible infringer from liability when
the accused device performs a substantially different function from the original device-would
be preferable to the adoption of compulsory licenses. See id. at 91-99.
56. Ayres & Talley, supra note 4, at 1092-94.
57. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 2(b) (1985) ("In exceptional circumstances, an
injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty.... Exceptional
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As noted above, it may be the case that there simply are not enough
instances of Region II cases to cause us to worry about how to handle
the few that arise. Employers can avoid Region II cases by expressly
requiring advance assignments,"8 and when this option fails, courts still
can avoid these cases by means of several strategies." Analysis of the
conflicting interests problem nevertheless may be helpful in understanding the ways in which various rights and duties can affect the optimal
use and disclosure of trade secrets.

circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior
to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a prohibitive
injuiction inequitable."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 44 cmt.
c, 45 cmts. b & g (1995) (similar). But then so did the drafters of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994) (stating that the court shall award the prevailing patent claimant "damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court," and permitting the court to "receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination...
of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances").
58. See supra text accompanying note 31.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
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